

~~TOP SECRET~~

ED

3.5(c)

4 August 1960

3.3(h)(2)



Copy No. C 71

# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 30  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. REFERRED TO: TS S R  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 762  
9 JUN 1980  
DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ REVIEWER:



~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4 AUGUST 1960

**I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC**

Sino-Burmese border commission apparently reaches agreement on boundary issues. ①

Comment on Chou En-lai's conciliatory notes to Nepal on recent border incidents. ②

**II. ASIA-AFRICA**


Comment on Congo situation. ③

Iraq--Nationalist elements committing violence, including assassinations, against Communists in Mosul and Kirkuk areas. ④

Lebanon--New cabinet composed of men of widely differing political views; drift toward military control may result if government operations inhibited. ⑤

**III. THE WEST**

Dominican Republic--Resignation of Trujillo's brother as President seen unlikely to mollify regime's critics. ⑥



~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [ ]

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

4 August 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC *Surah*

China-Burma: The Sino-Burmese joint boundary committee apparently has reached agreement on the main points at issue in the long-standing border dispute between the two countries. Peiping has permitted Burma to decide how much territory it will cede in the Kachin State, and Burma in turn has accepted China's demand for a smaller area farther south in the Wa States. A formal border treaty may now be readied, possibly in time for U Nu's expected visit to Peiping in October. In commentary clearly directed at Indian and other Asian opinion, Peiping has publicized progress toward the treaty as "proof" of its willingness to conduct "peaceful negotiations" on boundary questions. [ ] (Page 1)

*OK  
Second  
sentence  
changed*

China-Nepal: Chou En-lai's recent replies to Nepal's protests over Chinese border activities are designed to mollify Katmandu and smooth the way for joint border commission talks scheduled to begin on 8 August. Although Chou again denied any violation of Nepal's borders, Nepali officials said he offered "profuse apologies" for the "confessions" which captured Nepalis had been forced to sign and stated that Chinese troops had been withdrawn from the demilitarized zone on 25 July. Nepal's prime minister has welcomed the conciliatory Chinese actions, although he still contends that the clash in the Mustang area in late June took place in Nepali territory. [ ] (Page 2)

*OK*

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

\*Republic of the Congo: Strong Belgian reaction to Hammar-skjold's announcement of the imminent entry of UN troops into Katanga may stiffen Tshombé's opposition to this move and

*OK  
Delete  
3rd sentence  
P 1 and  
1st line  
of P 3*~~TOP SECRET~~ [ ]

~~TOP SECRET~~

force a delay in UN plans. This would further complicate the position of Dr. Bunche in negotiations with Tshombé, although Tshombé is unlikely to maintain his stand for full independence for Katanga. Dr. Bunche is scheduled to arrive in Elisabethville on 5 August. Tshombé has previously indicated his willingness to reconsider his secession from the Congo, provided the Congo is made a federation with each province retaining a large measure of autonomy. Brussels probably hopes that Tshombé can rejoin the Congo on these terms; Belgian officials, however, have indicated that they are unwilling to risk censure in the Security Council by retaining troops throughout Katanga. The anticipated regrouping of Belgian troops at the Kamina base in Katanga will fall short of satisfying Lumumba's demand for total evacuation of all Belgian armed forces. [redacted] (Page 3)

Iraq: A renewal of assassinations in Mosul, presumably against Communists, has caused concern to security authorities there, [redacted]

[redacted] The Communist press in Baghdad has been complaining for some time about murders of "patriots" in the Mosul and Kirkuk regions. Slowly, but apparently methodically, Communist leaders in the regions are being eliminated by vengeful nationalist elements. [redacted] (Page 4)

Lebanon: Saib Salam's 18-man cabinet, the largest in Lebanese history, formed on 2 August represents nearly every hue of the Lebanese political spectrum, including several pro-Nasir extremists. If the wide disparity of views represented in the cabinet inhibits effective operation of the government, a drift toward military control could result. While President Shihab's recent one-day "resignation" appears to have increased his prestige and influence, the new cabinet will be a test of his continued control. [redacted]

### III. THE WEST

Dominican Republic: The resignation of President Hector Trujillo, brother of the dictator, and the elevation to the presidency of Vice President Balaguer seems another step in the

4 Aug 60

DAILY BRIEF

Page ii

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [ ]

dictator's efforts to create a more favorable atmosphere prior to the 16 August meeting of foreign ministers of the OAS to hear Venezuelan charges against the Dominican Republic. However, only the removal of the dictator, his family, and close cohorts is likely to mollify the hatred of the Trujillo dictatorship inside the Dominican Republic as well as elsewhere in the hemisphere.

[ ] (Page 5)

#### IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS


With respect to the question of Sino-Soviet bloc intentions to initiate hostilities, the Watch Committee conclusions remain negative. [ ]

4 Aug 60

DAILY BRIEF

Page iii

~~TOP SECRET~~ [ ]



~~SECRET~~

## Burma and Communist China Nearing Final Border Settlement

The Sino-Burmese joint boundary committee apparently has reached agreement on the main points at issue in the long-standing border dispute between the two countries. [redacted]

Peiping has accepted the Burmese definition of the extent of territory to be ceded to China in the Hpimaw area of the Kachin State in return for Rangoon's acceptance of China's more modest territorial demands farther south in the Wa States. [redacted]

[redacted] China had originally asked for the return of the Namwan Tract, which had been under perpetual lease to Burma dating back to the period of British rule, but subsequently agreed to accept compensatory territory in the Wa States in return for granting Burma clear title to Namwan. China had also sought about 100 square miles more in the Hpimaw area than it appears to have gained.

The joint boundary committee will soon begin drafting the final boundary treaty, which will possibly be ready for signature during Premier Nu's contemplated visit to Peiping this October. Even though small territorial concessions have been made to China, the Burmese will view a final settlement on these terms as a triumph for their government in that China will have settled for much less than it could plausibly have claimed. A final settlement will remove the single most important source of friction between Burma and China, and will almost certainly increase Burmese receptivity to any new Chinese Communist economic and political initiatives.

Peiping, anxious to counter adverse Asian reaction to its difficulties with India, Nepal, and Indonesia, is publicizing progress toward the treaty as evidence of its observance of the Bandung principles of peaceful coexistence. For the past 18 months Peiping's propaganda has been holding up Sino-Burmese relations as a model for those with China's Asian neighbors. Chou En-lai on 1 August hailed Burma as the non-Communist country "always in the lead" in expressing friendliness toward China, pointing out that it was the first to conclude a treaty of friendship and nonaggression and will be the first to sign a boundary treaty with China. In commentary clearly directed toward India, the Chinese Communists point to the progress of the talks as proof that complicated boundary questions can be settled through peaceful negotiations provided the governments and leaders are mutually willing. [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Peiping Conciliatory Toward Nepal's Protests

Premier Chou En-lai has answered Nepalese Prime Minister Koirala's protest of 11 July over Chinese border activities with three separate communications designed to mollify Katmandu and smooth the way for the joint border commission talks scheduled to begin on 8 August. Anti-Chinese sentiment in Nepal has not subsided, and Peiping appears eager to deny India the opportunity to point to incidents along the Sino-Nepali border as proof of China's aggressiveness.

Chou again denied that Chinese troops had entered Nepal and said that Koirala was "misinformed" over reports of recent incursions of Chinese on photographic and survey missions. Nepali officials said Chou did offer "profuse apologies" for the action of Chinese troops in extracting "confessions" from ten Nepali villagers captured at the time of the 27 June incident in the Mustang area, however, and stated that troops had been entirely withdrawn from the demilitarized zone.

As an additional conciliatory gesture, the first Chinese ambassador resident in Katmandu arrived on 2 August.

Koirala has welcomed Peiping's conciliatory moves, although he continues to contend that the recent incident took place on the Nepalese side of the border. In reply to critics in parliament who urged a tougher policy toward China, Koirala has cited Peiping's apology, its prompt payment of compensation, and its withdrawal of troops from the demilitarized zone, as well as the pending border commission meetings, as more important than the precise determination of the locale of the Mustang incident.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~Tshombé Opposes Projected UN Occupation of Katanga

Strong Belgian reaction to Hammarskjold's announcement of the imminent entry of UN troops into Katanga may stiffen Tshombé's opposition to this move and force a delay in UN plans. This would further complicate the position of Dr. Bunche in negotiations with Tshombé, although Tshombé is unlikely to maintain his stand for full independence for Katanga. Dr. Bunche is scheduled to go to Elisabethville on 5 August. Tshombé, who probably has no more than 500 trained non-Belgian troops at his command, has previously indicated his willingness to re-join the Congo if it is reorganized as a confederation with a high degree of provincial autonomy.

Brussels' stated willingness to withdraw its forces in Katanga to its main base there, and to cooperate with the UN occupation of Katanga, appears to be in part a response to Western pressure. It will seriously impair the position of Tshombé, who is confronted with internal pressures for the maintenance of order and for reunification with the Lumumba government. Tshombé's parliamentary opposition has denounced his secession from the Congo and dissociated itself from assembly activities. At the same time, Belgian financial interests in Katanga are already hard hit by a decline of confidence in the Congo franc and by a 70- to 80-percent decline in business activity and are unlikely to encourage Tshombé in any unpromising military ventures.

Belgian officials reportedly accept "in principle" the need for a total military withdrawal from the Congo. Brussels appears to be moving toward such an evacuation, although the Belgians may attempt to negotiate with the Lumumba government for the retention of one or more of Belgium's three Congo bases to which they have withdrawn their forces. The Belgian cabinet is particularly sensitive to Belgian public opinion concerning any appeasement of the Lumumba government. The UN command in Leopoldville reportedly plans to send white contingents to Katanga in an effort to reassure the 15,000 Europeans still there.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~Communist Leaders Being Murdered in Northern Iraq

A renewal of assassinations in Mosul, presumably of Communists, has caused concern to security authorities there, [redacted]

[redacted] For the past two months there has been a series of political killings of Communists in the Mosul-Kirkuk area. The perpetrators have been either anti-Communist nationalists or members of families who lost relatives at the hands of the Communists during the reign of terror which followed the Mosul revolt in March 1959. These two groups appear to have joined forces in a campaign to eliminate Communist leadership in the area.

The Communist press in Baghdad has complained about a continuous series of anti-Communist incidents which have occurred without police censure in the Kirkuk-Mosul area. On one occasion the Baghdad Communist paper Ittihad al-Shaab listed 20 attacks on Communist "patriots"--burning of shops, woundings, assassinations, beatings, bombings, and arrests, and interference with union elections by the authorities. [redacted] assassinations of Communists have averaged 22 a month for the past several months.

Iraqi security authorities appear to have been ignoring attacks on Communists and making arrests among the party's supporters. [redacted]

[redacted] police had discovered papers in the home of one Communist which "reveal the existence of a plan for the petroleum union to take over the Basra Petroleum Company." [redacted]

[redacted] a Communist meeting in Baghdad it was said to be "the duty of the party" to assassinate prominent anti-Communists. [redacted]

[redacted] the Iraqi director of security has ordered "strict surveillance" of the illegal "orthodox" Communists. [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Brother of Dominican Dictator Resigns From Presidency

The resignation of President Hector Trujillo--brother of the dictator Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo--and the elevation of Vice President Joaquin Balaguer to the presidency seems to be another effort to create a more favorable attitude toward the Dominican Government among western hemisphere nations before the OAS foreign ministers' meeting on 16 August. The regime has also released approximately fifty imprisoned dissidents and two leaders of the January plot against the regime, and has issued a last-minute invitation to an OAS Commission to visit the Dominican Republic to investigate Venezuela's charge that Trujillo sponsored the attempted assassination of President Betancourt on 24 June. The Generalissimo probably is convinced that the United States and most OAS member nations will recommend some form of multilateral action against the Dominican Government after their foreign ministers meet to consider Venezuela's charges that his dictatorship is guilty of aggression.

A government-controlled newspaper reported on 3 August that Generalissimo Trujillo has given up his office in the National Palace in favor of a private office elsewhere. However, only the complete removal from the scene of the dictator, his family, and close cohorts is likely to mollify the hatred of the Trujillo dictatorship inside the country as well as elsewhere in the hemisphere. The dissidents are known to associate Balaguer with atrocities carried out against enemies of the regime.

[redacted] the Generalissimo, envisioning sanctions and boycotts by the OAS, is planning a false and bloodless revolt by military officers loyal to him. A false revolt, however, [redacted] could easily result in genuine revolt. General "Ramfis" Trujillo--the dictator's son--reportedly left the Dominican Republic on 27 July to live in Switzerland. [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**THE PRESIDENT**

**The Vice President**

**Executive Offices of the White House**

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

**The Treasury Department**

The Secretary of the Treasury

**The Department of State**

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

**The Department of Defense**

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

**The Department of Commerce**

The Secretary of Commerce

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**

The Director

**Atomic Energy Commission**

The Chairman

**National Security Agency**

The Director

**National Indications Center**

The Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~